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INTRODUCTION

A.

Overview

This article will examine when some attorney-client
communications may be considered in connection with a spoliation
claim based on an alleged breach of the duty to preserve
information. 1 The steps taken by a client to fulfill the duty to
preserve information, even if taken in response to privileged
communications, have been held to be discoverable, although related2
attorney communications have not been routinely discoverable.
Where there is a preliminary showing of a breach of the duty to3
preserve information, at least some attomey-client implementation

1.
2.
3.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part III.
When "implement," "implementation communications," and other similar terms and
phrases are used in this article, they refer to what was said and done in the course of
issuing a litigation hold notice, interviewing records custodians, information
technology personnel, key players, computer forensic experts, and generally
monitoring the preservation process.
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communications have not been protected by courts faced with the
issue.4
The courts' decisions may be supported by a number of different
theories, including: the communications are in furtherance of a
common-law duty, and not for the purpose of seeking legal advice;
under the crime, fraud, or tort exception to the privilege; under the
theory that the communications are fact work product and disclosable
pursuant to established work product rules; because they are put in
issue by an "advice of counsel" defense; or, under the attorney "selfdefense" doctrine.5 In short, there are two alternative paradigms.
Under one, the communications are not privileged at all. Under the
other, they are treated as exceptions to the privilege.7
Under the first rationale, because preservation communications are
made pursuant to a duty imposed by law, they are not privileged
communications seeking legal advice and absent a preliminary
showing of breach of the duty to preserve, the attorney-client
communications are wholly irrelevant to the claims, defenses, and
subject-matter of the action, and therefore not discoverable. 8 Under
the second theory, attorney-client preservation communications are
inherently privileged or work product; however, at least portions of
them may become discoverable under either an exception to, or
waiver of, those protections. The communications become relevant
when there is a preliminary showing of a failure to preserve
information that should have been preserved. 9 Regardless of the
rationale, it appears settled that, upon such a preliminary 0showing,
some attorney-client communications become discoverable.'
The outer boundary of a reviewing court's inquiry into attorneyclient preservation communications and analysis, however, remains
to be determined. Courts may distinguish between legal advice
related to preservation, on the one hand, and implementation
communications, on the other, with the former remaining protected
by the privilege in all but the most egregious circumstances, and the
latter open to discovery upon a preliminary showing of breach of

4.

See infra Part III.B-D.

5.

See infra Part IV.B-D, V.

6.

See infra Part V.C.

7.

See discussion infra Part IV.C. Although the attorney-client privilege is separate and
distinct from the work-product doctrine, on occasion the two are combined under the
umbrella of "privilege" for simplicity.

8.
9.
10.

See infra Part IV.E.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.
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duty.1 It is not clear whether legal analysis and advice concerning
preservation decisions, and client's12 specific requests for advice, will
be discoverable in some instances.
B.

FactualHypothetical

Assume the following: ABC Corporation reasonably anticipates
litigation with XYZ Corporation related to a June 2003 contract.
Eight weeks after litigation is anticipated, ABC's attorney sends key
employees a "privileged and confidential" litigation hold letter
directing preservation of all "relevant evidence." A month later,
ABC's attorney speaks with some ABC employees, but not with
others. ABC's president asks ABC's attorney to define the outer
contours of the duty to preserve, and they discuss how those
principles are applicable to ABC in this instance. ABC's counsel
retains a non-testifying forensic computer expert and, at counsel's
direction, the expert and ABC employees preserve some
electronically stored information (ESI) and paper documents, but-in
conjunction with ABC's attorneys--determine that other ESI, e.g.,
certain back up tapes and deleted data, need not be preserved. This
latter decision is based on counsel's analysis of case law defining the
duty to preserve back up tapes and data that are not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.
A lawsuit is
subsequently commenced against ABC. In discovery, XYZ asks
ABC employees to describe their preservation efforts, and XYZ
establishes that ABC failed to preserve unique information that was
relevant and allegedly subject to the duty to preserve. XYZ then
moves for sanctions.
In resolving that motion, what facts may the reviewing court
consider? Is ABC's litigation hold letter discoverable, in part or in its
entirety? Can XYZ properly discover what steps ABC employees
and experts took to fulfill the duty to preserve, given the fact that
those steps were taken on advice and instruction of counsel? Are
some or all of the details of ABC's attorney's communications with
ABC's key players open for deposition inquiry? Is counsel's analysis
and application of case law defining the duty to preserve back up
tapes open to discovery? Is the legal advice given by ABC's counsel
to ABC's president discoverable? And, if ABC believes that it
fulfilled its duty to preserve under the circumstances presented, can

11.

See infra Part 1V.B.

12.

See infra Part VI.
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ABC voluntarily present evidence of its due diligence, without
waiving its attorney-client privilege?
This article examines the answers that courts have given to some of
these questions and the way the rulings offer counsel and their clients
guidance on what to expect in the event that an opposing party
questions their compliance with the duty to preserve relevant
information. It does so in the context that "lawyers must understand
that information, as a cultural and technological edifice, has
profoundly and irrevocably changed. There has been a civilizationwide morgh, or pulse, or one might say that information has
evolved."'4 This has resulted in a "need to re-engineer" the litigation
process.'
C.

Background

When a prospective party reasonably anticipates litigation, that
party has a duty to preserve potentially relevant material. The duty
to preserve is one of the fundamental common-law foundations of the
adversarial system of justice. In today's litigation environment, it is
counsel who most often notify clients of the duty to preserve and
oversee the preservation process, draft litigation hold notices,
interview records custodians, key persons, and information
technology personnel, and6 take other steps to ensure that the duty to
preserve is not breached.'
The attorney-client privilege and work product protection are
likewise fundamental underpinnings of the adversarial system of
justice. The attorney-client privilege exists to encourage full and
frank communication between counsel and client.' 7 The work13.

14.
15.

16.

17.

George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10,
1 (2007), http://1aw.richmond.edu/jolt/vl3i3/
article 10.pdf.
Id. 26.
See, e.g., Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310-11 (D.
Del. 2000) ("A party, who is aware that evidence might be relevant to a pending or
future litigation, has an affirmative duty to preserve this material. This duty extends
to that party's attorneys." (citations omitted)); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen.
Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1446 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that GNC had a
duty to preserve relevant documents at inception of litigation).
The contours of the duty to preserve are discussed in a related article in this issue.
See Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionalityin the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-Litigation
PreservationDecisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 381 (2008).
E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("Its purpose is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration
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product doctrine recognizes that, in the adversarial system of justice,
"[p]roper preparation of a client's case demands that [counsel]
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference."' 8 Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), discovery of an opposing party's work
product is permitted only upon a showing "that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship 'to9
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."
When discovery of fact work product is permitted, courts are
enjoined to "protect against disclosure of the mental20 impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney.,
In the absence of a breach of the duty to preserve, courts have not
hesitated to hold that attorney-client preservation communications are
not discoverable; however, faced with a preliminary showing of a
breach of that duty, courts have required disclosure of some attorneyclient communications implementing the duty to preserve. 2 1 For
example, attorneys and clients have been deposed or otherwise
required to disclose their actions in preserving-or failing to
preserve-relevant material. 22 What do these decisions mean for
counsel and their clients when faced with actual or potential
litigation? Can they move forward with confidence that their
implementation communications will be protected from disclosure?
Or must they now assume that, at least with respect to the
preservation and production of discoverable materials, some, or
perhaps all, of their communications are themselves subject to
discovery?

18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client."); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1976)
("Confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal
assistance are privileged. The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to
make full disclosure to their attorneys." (citations omitted)).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Id.
See, e.g., Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC (Zubulake I), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United Med. Supply Co. v.
United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257 (2007).
See, e.g., Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989).
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Scope of This Inquiry

This article examines recent decisions holding that a client's
preservation actions are discoverable, and that some attorney-client
communications are discoverable and may be considered in
connection with a spoliation claim based on a preliminary showing of
a breach of the duty to preserve information. 2 3 To set the framework,
the article begins with the principle that, absent a showing of breach
of duty, attorneys' implementation communications with their clients,
and the steps taken by attorneys to preserve relevant materials, are
not discoverable; however, the steps a client takes to implement that
duty are discoverable. 24 This article then turns to those decisions that
have permitted discovery of attorney-client implementation
communications, in order to identify under what circumstances the
discovery was permitted and the rationales for permitting that
discovery. 25 Finally, the outer boundaries of that type of discovery
will be explored.2 6
II.

THE PRIVILEGE, WORK PRODUCT, AND THE DUTY TO
PRESERVE

A.

The Attorney-Client PrivilegeProtects CommunicationsRelated
to Legal Advice

It is generally assumed that confidential communications involving
legal advice between an attorney and client are privileged. 27 This
privilege is firmly grounded in public policy, 28 and the privilege is so
important to the functioning of the adversarial system, that Congress
currently is considering legislation that will prohibit government
agencies from making waiver of the privilege a "precondition" for

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

See infra Parts III-IV.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The attorney-client
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the
common law." (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EvIDENCE § 2290
(McNaughton rev. vol. 1961))).
Id. at 389; Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (noting the privilege is based
on the "necessity, in the interest.., of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely
and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of
disclosure"); see also Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 576 (2007) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege is a "cornerstone" of the legal system).
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29
lenient treatment by government prosecutors in criminal cases.
Furthermore, a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence is designed to ensure that the inadvertent production of
privileged30 material in litigation will not cause a waiver of the

privilege.

Nevertheless, not all communications between counsel and client
32
31
are privileged.3 ' In Fisher v. United States, for example, the
Supreme Court wrote that the privilege "protects only those
disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might
not have been made absent the privilege.,33 For a communication to
be privileged, it must be for the purpose of seeking or providing legal
advice, 34 and it protects the client's communication of information to

29.

30.

31.

32.
33.
34.

See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, H.R. 3013, 110th
61 (generally
Cong. (2007); see generally Paul & Baron, supra note 13, at
discussing pending legislation and Federal Rule of Evidence 502). The House Bill
was recently approved by a two-thirds majority and the Senate Bill is pending before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Library of Congress, Summary and Status of
H.R. 3013, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl10:HRO3013:@@@X (last
visited Mar. 5, 2008).
at
available
502,
EVID.
R.
FED.
Proposed
See
Maryland has amended its
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV_502_RevNote.pdf.
similar rule. See MD. R. 2-402; Court of Appeals of Maryland Rules Order, 158th
Report, 11-22 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/
rodocs/ro158.pdf.
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[Tlhe
attorney must have been engaged or consulted by the client for the purpose of
obtaining legal services or advice services or advice that a lawyer may perform or
give in his capacity as a lawyer, not in some other capacity. A communication is not
privileged simply because it is made by or to a person who happens to be a lawyer.").
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
Id.at 403 (emphasis added).
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981); Meredith, 572 F.2d at
601-02; McCafferty's, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 166 (D. Md.
1998); see also Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 272 (E.D. Va.
2004) ("To meet its burden on the attorney-client privilege claim, [the claimant] must
show ... that: (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or has sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the
bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c)for the purpose of
securingprimarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client."
(emphasis added)).
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the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining that legal advice.35 Thus, by
extension, when the lawyer interviews client personnel and gathers
information that is "part and parcel of legal advice given by the
lawyer, ' 36 those communications are privileged.37
B. The Work ProductDoctrine Protects Counsel's Communications
and Activities Undertaken Because of Litigation
38
The work-product doctrine has its origins in Hickman v. Taylor,
where the Supreme Court held that "lawyer" materials prepared in
anticipation 39 of litigation should not be subject to discovery by the
opposing party, stating:
[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties
and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case
demands that he assemble information, sift what he
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare
his legal theories andplan his strategy without undue and
needless interference.4 °
However, the Supreme Court did not grant absolute protection for
the "[w]ork product of [a] lawyer," noting that relevant,
nonprivileged facts could not be hidden by an attorney and that there
could be circumstances under which an adversary could establish
adequate reasons to justify intruding into that work product. 4'
In the federal courts, the work product protection is embodied in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which distinguishes fact
from opinion work product.42 Fact work product can be discoverable
35.

See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Glaxo Smith Kline, 294 F.3d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir.
2002).

36.

EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT

37.

DOCTRINE 244 (ABA 4th ed. 2004).
See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91; United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297
(9th Cir. 1996); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Massaro, No. CIV. A. 97-2022, 2000
WL 1176541, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2000) (enjoining in-house counsel from
disclosing client confidences and privileged information, including the shredding of
documents that led to an investigation of the client).

38.

329 U.S. 495 (1947).

39.

The duty to preserve relevant materials is a duty that arises because of pending or
anticipated litigation. The duty to preserve and the work-product doctrine share this
common basis.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 5 10-11.
Id.at 511-12.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.

40.
41.
42.
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upon a showing of substantial need and that the same information
43
cannot be obtained from another source without undue hardship.
Opinion work product, on the other hand, is almost always protected
from disclosure."
C. The Duty to PreservePotentially Relevant Information
Incorporatesa Duty to Communicate
In our adversary system, characterized by broad discovery in civil
litigation, the duty to preserve relevant information is critical to the
truth-finding function and the integrity of the judicial process.45 As a
duty to preserve
result, parties have long had a common-law
46
information relevant to the litigation.
The range and limit of the duty to preserve is addressed in many
decisions, and is beyond the scope of this article.47 The duty rests on
43.
44.

45.
46.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); e.g., Maertin v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 172 F.R.D.
143, 150 (D.N.J. 1997).
See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th
Cir. 1974); Trustmark Ins. Co. v. General & Cologne Life Re of Am., No. 00 C 1926,
2000 WL 1898518, at *3 (N.D. 111.Dec. 20, 2000) (finding that protection of an
attorney's opinion work product is almost absolute).
See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); In re
Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114, 125, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
("Discovery is run largely by attorneys, and the court and the judicial process depend
upon honesty and fair dealing among attorneys.... Zurich, as the lead insurer on the
case, and its attorneys, as lead counsel in the proceedings before me, owed the Court
and the public better conduct than the conduct described herein .... "); Thompson v.
U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 99-100 (D. Md. 2003); Trigon
Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 286 (E.D. Va. 2001) ("Though the Fourth
Circuit has not specifically spoken to the duty to preserve evidence ...

47.

it is a

necessary predicate of the controlling Fourth Circuit decisions that such a duty exists,
because, without such an obligation, there would be no wrongdoing in destroying
relevant documents."); Winters v. Textron, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 518, 520 (M.D. Pa.
1999) ("A duty to preserve evidence.., arises when there is (1) pending or probable
litigation involving the defendant; (2) knowledge of the existence or likelihood of
litigation, (3) foreseeable prejudice to the other party if the evidence were to be
discarded and (4) evidence relevant to the litigation." (citation omitted); Joseph
Gallagher, E-ethics: The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic Discovery Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 613, 617-18
(2007) ("[T]his [duty to preserve] creates an affirmative duty on outside counsel to
investigate the document retention policies of their clients during the earliest stages
of representation. Indeed, lawyers who advise their clients on the creation of a
document-retention policy, as well as in-house counsel charged with managing that
policy, have an ethical obligation to do so in a way that does not obstruct justice."
(footnotes omitted)).
For a discussion of the scope of the duty to preserve, see Grimm et al., supra note 16.
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both the attorney and the client. 48 The duty to preserve potentially
relevant information includes, and is effectuated by, a reciprocal duty
to communicate. 49 Counsel's duty to communicate with clients about
the preservation of discoverable materials has been articulated by the
American Bar Association,5 ° and in a variety of court decisions. 5 '
For example, in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V),52 the
court based its decision finding that there was a failure to preserve on
''counsel's obligation to ensure that relevant information is preserved
by giving clear instructions to the client to preserve such information
and, perhaps more importantly, a client's obligation to heed those
instructions," 53 and enjoined counsel and clients "to communicate
clearly and effectively with one another to ensure that litigation
48.

49.

50.

51.
52.
53.

See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL
66932, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated and remandedin part, No. 05CV1958RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube
Intern., Inc., 2007 WL 608343, at *5 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2007) (holding that, where
counsel's computer crashed, counsel was ordered to submit affidavit); Telecom Int'l
Am., Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 189 F.R.D. 76, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ( "Once [a party is] on
notice, the obligation to preserve evidence runs first to counsel, who then has a duty
to advise and explain to the client its obligations to retain pertinent documents that
may be relevant to the litigation."); Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation
ObligationsAfter the 2006 FederalE-Discovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
9,
22 (2007), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl3i3/article9.pdf ("Some decisions
imply that counsel owes an independent duty to a court to actively supervise a party's
compliance with preservation obligations.") (citing, inter alia, Zubulake V, 229
F.R.D. 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[C]ounsel [both employed counsel and outside
counsel] [are] responsible for coordinating her client's discovery efforts. In this case,
counsel failed to properly oversee UBS in a number of important ways, both in terms
of its duty to locate relevant information and its duty to preserve and timely produce
that information." (alterations in original)); Gregory G. Wrobel, Andrew M. Gardner
& Michael J. Waters, Counsel Beware: Preventing Spoliation of Electronic Evidence
in Antitrust Litigation, 20 ANTITRUST 79, 80 (2006) ("[Other cases] do not address
in the same depth the separate duty-if any-of counsel to locate and preserve
relevant electronic information.")). Under appropriate circumstances, the duty may
shift to the client, and it does not appear to be a non-delegable duty. Zubulake V, 229
F.R.D. at 425-26.
See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 424 ("The conduct of both counsel and client thus
calls to mind the now-famous words of the prison captain in Cool Hand Luke: 'What
we've got here is a failure to communicate."' (citation omitted)).
ABA CIvIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, No. 10 (August 2004) ("When a lawyer who has
been retained to handle a matter learns that litigation is probable or has been
commenced, the lawyer should inform the client of its duty to preserve potentially
relevant documents .... ").
See, e.g., Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422; Telecom Int'l, 189 F.R.D. at 81.
229 F.R.D. 422.
Id. at 424.
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proceeds efficiently., 54 The duty runs both ways, and clients have a
duty to communicate with their attorneys. In Wachtel v. Guardian
Life Ins.,5 the court found that the defendants "violated the integrity
of this [c]ourt's judicial processes by: ... (10) keeping even their

own outside counsel... unaware of their e-mail procedures that
" ' 56
resulted in widespread dereliction of their discovery obligations.
Recently, in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,57 the court noted:
For the current "good faith" discovery system to function in
the electronic age, attorneys and clients must work together
to ensure that both understand how and where electronic
documents, records and emails are maintained and to
determine how best to locate, review, and produce
responsive documents. Attorneys must take responsibility
for ensuring that their clients conduct a comprehensive and
appropriate document search.58
In short, the duty to preserve incorporates a duty to engage in
effective attorney-client communication.
III. DISCOVERABILITY OF A CLIENT'S ACTIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE DUTY TO PRESERVE
It is axiomatic that an opponent may routinely obtain discovery of a
client's actions taken to implement the duty to preserve information.
As set forth below, this is no different than the traditional "paper

54.

Id.

55.

Nos. 01-4183 (FSH), 03-1801(FSH), 2007 WL 1752036 (D.N.J. June 18, 2007).

56.

Id. at *8.

57.

No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated and
remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
2008). In addition to addressing counsel's duty to communicate to the client,
Qualcomm also addressed the client's duty to communicate with counsel:

Qualcomm also has not presented any evidence that outside
counsel knew enough about Qualcomm's organization and
operation to identify all of the individuals whose computers

should be searched and determine the most knowledgeable
witness. And, more importantly, Qualcomm is a large corporation
with an extensive legal staff; it clearly had the ability to identify

the correct witnesses and determine the correct computers to
search and search terms to use. Qualcomm just lacked the desire
to do so.

58.

Id. at *11 n.6.
Id. at *9.
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discovery" paradigm of asking a deponent to describe his or her
search for responsive paper documents.
It is of no moment that the paper or electronic search was
conducted at the direction of counsel. Parties are permitted to inquire
into an opponent's efforts to preserve relevant information through
interrogatories and in depositions directed to the opposing client. 59 In
the ESI context, this is exemplified by In re eBay Seller Antitrust
Litigation.6 °
In eBay, the parties were locked in acrimonious "discovery about
discovery,'
in which the plaintiff demanded the production of
defendant's litigation hold notices (termed "document retention
notices," or DRNs, by eBay) in order to determine whether eBay had
preserved relevant electronic information. 62 eBay refused to produce
the DRNs, claiming that they had been "drafted by in-house counsel
in consultation with outside counsel and were expressly labeled as
'Attorney-Client Privileged & Confidential"' and that they contained
information "protected by either the privilege or work product
doctrine with respect to counsel's analysis of plaintiffs' claims in this
litigation., 63 In response, the court ruled that:
eBay need not produce copies of the DRNs nor any
information about matters contained therein that are
privileged or constitute work product. Plaintiffs, however,
are entitled to inquire into the facts as to what the employees
receiving the DRNs have done in response; i.e., what efforts
they have undertaken
to collect and preserve applicable
64
information.
The court went on to define the appropriate boundaries for
plaintiffs Rule 30(b)(6) deposition inquiry into eBay's steps to
identify and preserve relevant evidence:
Although plaintiffs may not be entitled to probe into what
exactly eBay's employees were told by its attorneys, they
are certainly entitled to know what eBay's employees are
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See, e.g., In re Triton Energy Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 5:98CV256, 2002 WL 32114464,
at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002) (noting Triton's witnesses testified in deposition that
they had not been asked by Triton's counsel to produce or preserve documents).
No. C 07-01882 JF (RS), 2007 WL 2852364 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007); accord
Zubulake V,229 F.R.D 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
eBay, 2007 WL 2852364, at *1 n.1.
Id.at *1.
Id.at *2.
Id.at*1.
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doing with respect to collecting and preserving ESI.
Furthermore, because it would neither be reasonable nor
practical to require or even to permit plaintiffs to depose all
600 employees [who received the litigation hold notice], it is
appropriate to permit plaintiffs to discover what those
employees are supposed to be doing. Even though such
inquiry may, indirectly, implicate communications from
counsel to the employees, the focus can and should be on
the facts of what eBay's document retention and collection
policies are, rather than on any details of the [litigation hold
letter].... [P]laintiffs are entitled to know what kinds and
categories of ESI eBay employees were instructed to
preserve and collect, and what specific actions they were
instructed to undertake to that end.
eBay stands for the proposition that the steps taken by a client to
implement a litigation hold are discoverable, without any showing of
need, loss of ESI, or otherwise. Quite simply, those steps are both
relevant and unprivileged. As noted, however, the eBay court did
not, on the facts presented, permit discovery of counsel's litigation
hold instructions to the client.66
IV. DISCOVERABILITY OF COUNSEL'S COMMUNICATIONS
IN FULFILLING THE DUTY TO PRESERVE
Absent a preliminary showing of a failure to preserve that which
should have been preserved, courts have generally refused to permit
discovery of counsel's communications related to the preservation of
information. 67 Courts have permitted such discovery,
however, when
68
preserve.
to
failure
a
of
showing
a
confronted with
A.

Absent a PreliminaryShowing of a Failureto Preserve That
Which Should Have Been Preserved,Courts Have Generally
Refused to PermitDiscovery of Counsel's Communications
Relatedto the Preservationof Information

As noted above, in eBay, the court ruled that, "eBay need not
produce copies of the DRNs [drafted by counsel] nor any information

65.

Id. at *2 (footnote omitted).

66.
67.

Id.
E.g., Gibson v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123-24 (N.D. Ga. 2007)

(refusing discovery of litigation hold notice as work product); see also India
Brewing, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 194 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (holding

68.

document retention policy irrelevant in absence of showing of failure to preserve).
See, e.g., Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551-53 (D. Minn. 1989).
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about matters contained therein that are privileged or constitute work
product., 69 The court, however, left open the question of whether the
litigation hold notice was protected by the privilege or work product
doctrine. 70
In Muro v. Target Corp.,71 the court reached a similar conclusion.
The court wrote:
Muro's fifth objection is to the Magistrate Judge's ruling
that Target's "litigation hold" notices are subject to the
attorney-client privilege and to work product protection.
But Muro makes no argument as to what error the
Magistrate Judge made in classifying the notices as
privileged, after conducting an in camera review of the
documents, other than to say that she finds it "incredible"
that the documents would contain privileged information.
The court has examined the litigation hold notices in
camera. Each seem to be communications of legal advice
from corporate counsel to corporate employees regarding
document preservation. As the litigation hold notices, on
their face, appear to be privileged material, there is no basis
for finding that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred, nor any
need to address Muro's argument that work product
protection is overcome here by her showing of need.
Similarly, in Gibson v. Ford Motor Co., 73 the court explained why
litigation hold notices sent by an attorney to a client were not
discoverable:
In the Court's experience, these instructions are often, if not
always, drafted by counsel, involve their work product, are
often overly inclusive, and the documents they list do not
necessarily bear a reasonable relationship to the issues in
This is not a document relating to the
litigation.
Rather, the document relates
Defendant's business.
exclusively to this litigation, was apparently created after
this dispute arose, and exists for the sole purpose of assuring
compliance with discovery that may be required in this
69.
70.

71.
72.
73.

eBay, 2007 WL 2852364, at * 1.
Id. at *2 n.3. ("Whether the privilege or work product protection would apply to
instructions regarding document retention or collection is far from certain. In light of
the conclusions reached in the remainder of this order, however, the Court need not
decide that question at this time.")
No. 04 C 6267, 2007 WL 3254463 (N.D. I11.Nov. 2, 2007).
Id. at *9 (citations omitted).
510 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
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litigation. Not only is the document likely to constitute
attorney work-product, but its compelled production could
dissuade other businesses from issuing such instructions in
the event of litigation.74
Other recent decisions recognize the protected status of litigation
hold notices, including Kingsway Financial Services, Inc. v. Price
Waterhouse-Coopers LLP,' 5 Turner v. Resort Condominiums
International,76 and Capitano v. FordMotor Co. 7 7 In these decisions,

with greater or lesser analysis, courts declined requests to order that
litigation hold notices be produced.78 In summary, absent a showing
of a breach of the duty to preserve, attorney-client preservation
communications have not been discoverable and were held to be
either privileged or work product.
B.

Upon a Showing of a Breach of the Duty to Preserve, Some
Attorney-Client CommunicationsRelating to the Implementation
of the Duty to PreserveAre Discoverable

Faced with a failure to preserve information that should have been
preserved, courts have considered attorney-client communications in
addressing spoliation issues. Preceding Zubulake V, Judge Shira
Scheindlin issued a series of decisions addressing defendant UBS's

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

Id. at 1123. It is noteworthy that in Gibson, unlike Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D 422, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), the requesting party did not make a preliminary showing that ESI
had not been preserved. Gibson, 510 F. Supp. at 1123.
No. 03 Civ. 5560 RMB HBP, 2006 WL 1520227, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006)
(denying motion to compel production of litigation hold notice and holding that
failure to list the notice on privilege log did not waive the privilege).
No. 1:03-cv-2025-DFH-WTL, 2006 WL 1990379, at *7-8 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 2006)
(denying motion to compel production of litigation hold notice which defendant
claimed was privileged).
831 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (noting that "'suspension orders'
may lead to the production of admissible evidence and are, therefore, relevant" but
holding that they "are privileged communications from attorney to client which relate
to legal advice given by counsel to client and, as such, are protected as attorney-client
privileged documents").
The decision in India Brewing, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190 (E.D.
Wis. 2006), presents an interesting comparison to the "litigation hold" cases. In
India Brewing, the court held that, because there was no evidence of failure to
preserve information, the responding party's document retention policy was
irrelevant and not discoverable. Id. at 192. It wrote that "IBI has failed to persuade
the court that the document retention policy ... is relevant to any claim or defense
alleged in the pleadings. Thus, the motion to compel production of the document
retention policy will be denied." Id.
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failure to preserve relevant ESI.79 The detail with which the court
considered the communications between UBS and its counsel is
illustrated in the following passage:
Fully aware of their common law duty to preserve relevant
evidence, UBS's in-house attorneys gave oral instructions in
August 2001-immediately after Zubulake filed her EEOC
charge-instructing employees not to destroy or delete
material potentially relevant to Zubulake's claims, and in
fact to segregate such material into separate files for the
lawyers' eventual review. This warning pertained to both
electronic and hard-copy files, but did not specifically
pertain to so-called "backup tapes," maintained by UBS's
information technology personnel. In particular, UBS's inhouse counsel, Robert L. Salzberg, "advised relevant UBS
employees to preserve and turn over to counsel all files,
records or other written memoranda or documents
concerning the allegations raised in the [EEOC] charge or
any aspect of [Zubulake's] employment." Subsequently but still in August 2001 - UBS's outside counsel met with a
number of the key players in the litigation and reiterated Mr.
Salzberg's instructions, reminding them to preserve relevant
documents, "including e-mails." Salzberg reduced these
instructions to writing in e-mails dated February 22, 2002 immediately after Zubulake filed her complaint - and
September 25, 2002.
Finally, in August 2002, after
Zubulake propounded a document request that specifically
called for e-mails stored on backup tapes, UBS's outside
counsel instructed UBS information technology personnel to
stop recycling backup tapes.
Every UBS employee
mentioned in this Opinion (with the exception of Mike
Davies) either personally spoke to UBS's outside counsel
about the duty to preserve
e-mails, or was a recipient of one
s
of Salzberg's e-mails. o
The Zubulake V court considered the fact that: UBS's "counsel
instructed UBS's information technology personnel that backup tapes

79.

80.

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake H1), 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 111), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D 422, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted).
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were also subject to the litigation hold;" 8' UBS's counsel "advised
UBS's information technology personnel to locate and retain all
existing backup tapes for employees identified by plaintiff;" and
UBS's counsel "re-emphasized that directive and confirmed that
these tapes continued to be preserved both orally and in writing on
several subsequent occasions."8 2 The court referred to specific
conversations between UBS's outside counsel and key UBS
employees by date,83 and reviewed other attorney-client
communications in detail sufficient to permit it84to conclude that there
were "clear and repeated warnings of counsel.,
The Zubulake V court did not sto there. It also considered what
It noted that counsel "failed to
UBS's counsel did not say to UBS.
request retained information from one key employee and to give the
litigation hold instructions to another" and that counsel "failed to
adequately communicate with another employee about ... how she
maintained her computer files," and "failed to safeguard backup tapes
that might have contained some of the deleted e-mails."8 6 And,
finally, the court inferred the content of attorney-client
from the production of materials based upon client
communications
87
conduct.

The Zubulake V court relied on several decisions in which attorneyclient communications were considered in evaluating a party's
For example, the court cited Keir v.
preservation efforts.
UnumProvident Corp., in which certain electronic records were
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

88.

Id.at 427. "In August 2002, after Zubulake specifically requested e-mail stored on
backup tapes, UBS's outside counsel orally instructed UBS's information technology
personnel to stop recycling backup tapes." Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 215.
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 425 n.15 (citation omitted).
Id.at 434-35.
Id. at 426.
See id.
at 424.
Id.
See id.at 429 (discussing the witness's production of responsive e-mails shortly after
the witness testified in deposition about the substance of her preservation-related
communications with counsel).
No. 02 Civ. 8781(DLC), 2003 WL 21997747 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003), cited in
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 434. In addition to Keir, the Zubulake V court provides a
brief overview of cases dealing with counsel's obligation to preserve evidence. See,
e.g., Zubulake V,229 F.R.D. at 433 n.80 (citing Telecom Int'l Am., Ltd. v. AT&T
Corp., 189 F.R.D. 76, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Once on notice [that evidence is
relevant], the obligation to preserve evidence runs first to counsel, who then has a
duty to advise and explain to the client its obligations to retain pertinent documents
that may be relevant to the litigation.") (citing Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 18 (D. Neb. 1983))); id at 434 n.87 (citing Metro.
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erased, triggering discovery about discovery. 89 In considering
whether spoliation had occurred, the Keir court considered a series of
attorney-client communications, including an email from the legal
department to a UnumProvident employee, 90 an oral communication
from a UnumProvident employee to the legal department, 9 1 the law
department's forwarding of a court order to corporate staff,92 and a
conference call between counsel and staff.93 The court ordered
"UnumProvident... to provide.., an affidavit from one or more
witnesses of the defendants or its counsel who had firsthand
knowledge" of facts pertinent to the loss. 94 At the court-ordered
evidentiary hearing on the loss of the data, "UnumProvident invoked
its attorney-client privilege to protect most of its communications
concerning the issues addressed at the hearing." 95 The court was
nonetheless able to ascertain that UnumProvident had failed to
communicate specific preservation instructions to its agent, IBM,
resulting in loss of the data. 96 Thus, in Keir, attorney-client
implementation communications were explored; however, the court
did not conduct a full-scale inquiry into areas covered by the
privilege.
Zubulake V and Keir do not stand alone. For example, in Cache La
Poudre Feeds, Inc. v. Land OLakes,97 the court considered without
comment the communications and actions of counsel:

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Opera Ass'n. v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union, 212
F.R.D. 178, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ordering default judgment against defendant as a
discovery sanction because "counsel (1) never gave adequate instructions to their
clients about the clients' overall discovery obligations, [including] what constitutes a
'document' ... ; (2) knew the Union to have no document retention or filing systems
and yet never implemented a systematic procedure for document production or for
retention of documents, including electronic documents; (3) delegated document
production to a layperson who... was not instructed by counsel[ ] that a document
included a draft or other nonidentical copy, a computer file and an e-mail; ... and
(5) ...failed to ask important witnesses for documents until the night before their
depositions and, instead, made repeated, baseless representations that all documents
had been produced.")).
Keir, 2003 WL 21997747, at *1.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.at *8.
Id.at *10 (emphasis added).
Id. at * 11 n.3.

96.
97.

See id. at *5-6.
244 F.R.D. 614 (D. Colo. 2007).
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In this case, Land O'Lakes's General Counsel and retained
counsel failed in many respects to discharge their
obligations to coordinate and oversee discovery.
Admittedly, in-house counsel established a litigation hold
shortly after the lawsuit commenced and communicated that
fact to Land O'Lakes employees who were believed to
possess relevant materials. However, by his own admission,
Land O'Lakes' General Counsel took no independent action
to verify the completeness of the employees' document
production. As [general counsel] explained, he simply
assumed that the materials he received were complete and
the product of a thorough search. While [general counsel]
presumed that e-mails generated by former employees
would be located on shared computer drives utilized by
current employees, he made no effort to verify that
assumption.
Without validating the accuracy and
completeness of its discovery production, Land O'Lakes
continued its routine practice of wiping clean the computer
hard drives for former employees. Under the circumstances
and without some showing of a reasonable inquiry, it is
difficult to understand how Defendants' retained counsel
could legitimately claim on July 7, 2005 that Land O'Lakes
had "made every effort to produce
98 all documentation and
provide all relevant information.'
These problems persuaded the court to authorize a deposition of
Land O'Lakes's counsel: "I permitted Plaintiff to take a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition to explore the procedures Land O'Lakes took to
identify, preserve and produce.., responsive documents. Mr. Janzen
[the attorney] testified that he instructed employees to produce all ...
documents 99responsive to discovery requests served in the PROFILE
litigation."
In reviewing the evidence, the court noted that "Mr. Janzen [the
attorney] did not have a full understanding of his company's
computer systems or the process for creating computer back-up
tapes,"' 100 and that "Mr. Janzen conceded that no attempt was made to
verify whether anyone actually reviewed the [company] website for
responsive materials."01
Thus, the court considered counsel's
instructions to his client's employees, and whether counsel had a

98.

Id. at 630 (citation omitted).

99.
100.

Id. at 634.
Id. at 628.

101.

ld. at 632.
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"full understanding" of his client's computer systems. 102 As in
Zubulake V, the court's rationale for requiring disclosure of attorneyclient communications relating to the duty to preserve appears to rest
on the presumption that counsel had a duty to establish a litigation
hold and oversee discovery.' 0 3
Similarly, in United Medical Supply Co. v. United States,'1 4 the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims, faced with the government's
inadequate document retention and undisputed destruction of
documents in violation of the duty to preserve, 10 5 engaged in a
comprehensive examination of the preservation communications
between the two government attorneys responsible for identifying
and preserving relevant materials.' 0 6 It then closely analyzed
discussions between another government attorney, Mr. Chadwick,
and a government paralegal, Mr. Brown, about "collecting responsive
documents from all the facilities involved in this matter," and secured
the affidavit testimony of Mr. Chadwick that he had instructed Mr.
Brown "to gather and produce all available records of the medical
treatment facilities relating to alleged diverted purchases of medical
and surgical supplies."' 0 7 Faced with multiple preservation failures,
the court wrote:
In light of these serious allegations,.., the court ordered
defendant to file two additional affidavits: one by Mr.
Chadwick and the other by Mr. Brown, detailing their
conversations regarding Mr. Brown's search for documents.
The court also ordered defendant to file copies of any
general notices sent, either in paper or electronic form, by
defendant to all affected [medical treatment facilities]
requesting or
08 relating to the preservation of relevant
documents.
In short, after being presented with a breach of the duty to preserve,
the court probed attorney-client communications and attorneyparalegal discussions, and demanded production of the government's

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 634.
Id. at 629-30.
77 Fed. C1. 257 (2007).
Id.at 264, 273-74.
Id. at 260.
Id.at 260-61.
Id. at 262.
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litigation hold notices, even though the failure
to preserve was not
0 9
intentional, but a result of mere negligence.'
These decisions are in accord with Guideline No. 9 of the Sedona
Conference Commentary on Legal Holds, which notes that a legal
hold policy and the process of implementation of that policy "may 1be
10
subject to scrutiny by the opposing party and review by the court."
The Sedona Conference Commentary reflects a growing trend in
litigation where one party alleges that another party has failed to
satisfy its duty to preserve."' The Sedona Conference Commentary
to Guideline No. 9 advises that:
Considering issues regarding work product and attorneyclient privilege, the [litigation hold] documentation need not
disclose strategy or legal analysis. However, sufficient
documentation should be included to demonstrate to
opposing parties and the court that the legal hold was
implemented in a reasonable, consistent and good 2 faith
manner should there be a need to defend the process.
The Commentary goes on to note:
While it may never be necessary to disclose this [litigation
hold] information, or disclosure may be made only to the
court in camera to preserve privileged legal advice and
work product information, the availability of documentation
[of creation and implementation of the litigation hold] will
preserve the option of the party to disclose the information
in the event a challenge to the preservation efforts is
raised. 113
In short, when there is a need to defend the preservation process,
the Sedona litigation hold guidelines contemplate that courts may
inquire into implementation of the legal hold and that the inquiry may

109.
110.

111.
112.
113.

Id. at 272-74.
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION
& PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON LEGAL HOLDS: THE
TRIGGER AND THE PROCESS 4 guideline 9 (drft. ed. 2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/Legal holds.pdf [hereinafter
LEGAL HOLDS]. Guideline No. 5 of the Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal
Holds discusses judicial evaluation of "an organization's legal hold decision." See
id at 10.
See id at 5-7, 15.
Id.at 15 (emphasis added).
Id at 16.
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require the disclosure of some attorney-client communications." 4
The Sedona guidelines suggest that parties and their counsel should
not include legal strategy or legal advice in the legal hold notice, so
as to ensure continued protection for that information." 5
In the Sedona guidelines, and in each of these and many other
cases, 116 when faced with evidence that a party had failed to preserve
relevant ESI, courts considered some attorney-client communications

114.
115.
116.

See id. at 15-16.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Peskoffv. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 55 (D.D.C. 2007) ("In response to my
order, Faber's counsel submitted an affidavit that described the previously conducted
search for emails."); In re Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114, 117,
120 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[Plaintiffs] allege that the positions that Zurich took in its
pleadings, motions, and other papers were objectively unreasonable, in violation of
Rule 11, and that Zurich produced certain documents much later than they were
required to produce the documents, and destroyed other documents, in violation of
Rule 37. These allegations require the Court to consider what Zurich and its lawyers
knew, when they knew it, and whether such knowledge rendered their pleadings,
motions, and conduct during discovery subject to sanctions.... On January 7, 2002,
Thomas W. Brunner, a partner at the law firm of Wiley Rein LLP, then known as
Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, who became the lead lawyer for the insurance
companies in the case before me, met with primary liability and excess liability
underwriters and instructed that 'all communications relating to [the] situation should
be preserved, including communications that would be discarded in the ordinary
course of business."' (citation omitted)); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 439 F.
Supp. 2d 524, 545 (E.D. Va. 2006) ("To help accomplish these corporate objectives,
Karp, in January 1998, telephoned Diane Savage, a partner at the law firm Cooley
Godward. Karp told Savage that 'he was working at Rambus, and that he was
looking for some litigation-somebody to provide him with litigation assistance.' In
response to that request, Savage asked Dan Johnson, a litigation partner at Cooley
Godward, to meet with Karp."); Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., No. 98 C
7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *13-14, *39-40 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) (considering
statements by outside attorneys to board and failure of in-house attorney to take
certain actions); School-Link Techs., Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., No. 05-2088-JWL,
2007 WL 677647, at *4-5 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2007) (considering deposition testimony
that defendant's "key player" employee was never contacted by counsel or instructed
to preserve information, and considering affidavit that defense counsel instructed
defendant to preserve and gather documents, resulting in collection of more than
7,500 pages); cf Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 035340 JF(RS), 2007 WL 1848665, at *2, n.4 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) ("The Flynn
and Charno declarations also both state that they received such [preservation]
instructions from American Blind's counsel. The inclusion of such statements is
curious given the Court's express instruction that the declarants could and should
state what they did [to preserve evidence] without disclosing communications with
counsel." (emphasis omitted)).
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in resolving whether the duty to preserve had been violated." 7 In
each of these cases, the courts appear to have limited their inquiry to
consideration of attorney-client communications focused on the
implementation of the duty to preserve and not on legal advice or
litigation strategy. 18 The courts, however, generally did not provide
of attorney-client
rationale for their consideration
the
communications. 11 9
C. One Justificationfor ConsideringAttorney-Client
Communications When There Has Been a Breach of the Duty to
Preserve is the Crime, Fraud,or Tort Exception to the Privilege
The crime, fraud, or tort exception' 20 to the privilege will abrogate
claims of privilege where the client consulted with counsel in order to
commit a crime, fraud, or tort, and the challenged communications or
attorney work product were "in furtherance" of that alleged crime or
fraud.' ' Courts also have applied the crime, fraud, or tort exception
where counsel committed fraud on the court by engaging in a cover
122
up of the client's prior misconduct and document destruction.

117.

118.
119.
120.

121.

122.

LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 110, at 15-16; Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v. BASF
Corp., No. 4:04-CV-3356, 2007 WL 3342423, at *2, *4 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007)
(considering affidavit of counsel); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Intern., Inc., No. 051203-WEB, 2007 WL 608343, at *5 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2007) (covering deposition of
counsel); Thompson v. HUD, 219 F.R.D. 93, 104 (D. Md. 2003) (noting failure of
counsel to request preservation).
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 110, at 15-16.
Id.
The exception is sometimes referred to as the crime-fraud exception and sometimes
as the "crime, fraud or tort" exception because some courts will apply the exception
to attorney-client communications in furtherance of a tort. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that if FMC made false
statements to the EPA after having consulted with counsel, the crime-fraud exception
would be applied to counsel's work product); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
540 F.2d 1215, 1221-22 (4th Cir. 1976), Berroth v. Kan. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 586, 589 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that Kansas statutorily defines the
exception to include torts).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000); Theodore
L. Banks, Leslie Wharton, Michael R. Geske, Cheryl G. Ragsdale, Erik D. Nadolink
& Charles R. Wall, Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product
Protections, in ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING
BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 33-153 (Robert L. Haig, ed., West 2007).
In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In this case, the government
alleged that the defendant engaged in document destruction and misrepresentations
that constituted fraud on the court. The D.C. Circuit held that client communications
with counsel about past misconduct would be protected, but that communications that
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Recently, in In re Grand Jury Investigation,'23 the court held that
certain attorney-client communications fell within the crime-fraud
exception where the client used counsel's legal advice to destroy
electronic information.'1 24 The court stated:
If, with knowledge of the Government's interest in
retrieving any remaining emails, Jane Doe continued to
receive emails that were arguably responsive to the
subpoena and failed to use her position as an executive of
the Organization to direct that all email deletions stop
immediately, she may be viewed as furthering the
obstruction of the grand jury's investigation or the
obstruction of justice.... In any event, if Jane Doe learned
of the Government's interest in certain documents from her
conversation with Attorney on January 20, 2005 and
subsequently acquiesced in the deletion or destruction of
those documents, the second
25 prong of the crime-fraud
exception would be satisfied. 1
The court's reasoning here is significant because it demonstrates
that the crime-fraud exception can be used to abrogate the privilege
r26
even when counsel advised the client to fulfill its duty to preserve.
In this case, because the government was able to show consultation
with the attorney, and a subsequent improper deletion of email, the

were part of a cover-up would be subject to the crime-fraud exception. Id. at 398,
123.

124.

125.
126.

402.
445 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, Doe v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 538

(2006).
Id. at 278; see also Allman, supra note 48, at 13,
23 ("Conversations about
preservation obligations are not necessarily privileged when criminal grand jury
investigations involving potential criminal obstruction of justice are involved."
(citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 269)).
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 279.
Application of the crime-fraud exception has never required knowing participation by
the attorney in the client's crime or fraud. The only requirement is that counsel's
work or advice be used by the client to engage in wrongdoing. See, e.g., Wachtel v.
Guardian Life, Nos. 01-4183 (FSH), 03-1801(FSH), 2007 WL 1752036, at *8
(D.N.J. June 18, 2007) ("The Health Net Defendants have violated the integrity of
this Court's judicial processes by .

.

. keeping even their own outside counsel ...

unaware of their e-mail procedures that resulted in widespread dereliction of their
discovery obligations."); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 103 (D.N.J.
2006); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 524, 545 (E.D. Va.
2006).
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Third Circuit affirmed an
127 order enforcing the subpoena for attorneyclient communications.
In Rambus v. Infineon Technologies AG, 128 the court applied the
crime, fraud, or tort exception to the destruction of ESI in a civil
case. 12 9 The court held "that the crime/fraud exception extends to
materials or communication created for planning, or in furtherance
of, spoliation."' 130 Rambus destroyed relevant materials at a time
when it had a duty to preserve the evidence.' 3 1 Rambus organized a
"shred day" and destroyed 20,000 pounds of documents.' 32 In
resolving the resulting dispute over Rambus' duty to preserve, the
court considered attorney-client communications such as those of
Rambus' former outside patent prosecution counsel who "testified
that he destroyed some documents, pursuant to orders from Rambus,
just before Rambus instituted this litigation in 2000 but before
Rambus sent a letter to Infineon accusing it of infringement,"' 33 and
those of one of Rambus' in-house attorneys who "testified that one
of the understood reasons behind Shred Day was that 'some of that
stuff is discoverable."1 34 On these facts, the court found: "It is selfevident.., that any communication between lawyer and client
respecting spoliation is fundamentally inconsistent with the asserted
principles behind the recognition of the attorney-client privilege,
namely, 'observance of law' or the 'administration of justice."' 135 In
a subsequent decision involving Rambus, Samsung Electronics Co. v.
Rambus,136 the trial judge who authored Rambus v. Infineon
127.

In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 280; cf Tigard Sportsurfaces, LLC v.
Syntennico, Inc., No. CIV. 98-1359-JE, 2000 WL 284189, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 10,
2000) (denying application of crime-fraud exception to abrogate privilege where

client erased tapes after consultation with counsel).
128.

220 F.R.D. 264 (E.D. Va. 2004).

129.

Id. at 279.

130.

Id. at 283; accord Wachtel v. Guardian Life, 2007 WL 1752036, at *2 (citing
Rambus v. Infineon, 220 F.R.D. at 283); Wachtel v. Health Net, 239 F.R.D. at 103

(noting that, "when outside counsel asked employees to search for emails in response
to Plaintiffs' document requests and Court Orders, that counsel did not know from
Health Net that these employees could not access 'historic' e-mail beyond the most
current three month period."); PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

PRACTICE 123 (ABA 2005) ("Developing case law supports the application of the
crime/fraud exception.").
Rambus v. lnfineon, 220 F.R.D. at 280.
Id.at 284.
Id.
Id.at 285.
Id.at 284.
439 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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Technologies AG, noted that the attorney-client and work product
privileges were pierced in Infineon.137 Rambus v. Infineon was
squarely grounded on the crime, fraud, or tort exception to the
privilege.
Other courts have applied the crime, fraud, or tort exception where
counsel's advice or work product is used to destroy relevant evidence
or otherwise "undermines the adversary system itself."' 39 In
Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 40 the court was faced with a situation
where attorneys had directed destruction of evidence after the duty to
preserve had arisen. 14 1 In resolving the discovery dispute, attorneys
were deposed, their calendar
entries were entered into evidence, and
42
their thoughts explored. 1
Although the crime,, fraud, or tort exception may provide
justification for permitting discovery of attorney-client preservation
communications in the context of a failure to preserve, that exception
is not the only one that may be applicable nor does it appear to be the
vehicle employed in decisions such as Zubulake V. Obviously, each
case turns on its own unique facts.
D. Where There Has Been a Failureto Preserve,Attorney-Client
Communications May Be Consideredif They Are Placed "In
Issue " by the Client, if the Client Waives Any Privilege,or if
There Are Allegations That Trigger the Attorney Self-Defense
Doctrine
In addition to the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, attorneyclient communications implementing the duty to preserve relevant
material may also become discoverable under a number of waiver
doctrines. For example, by putting counsel's actions and advice "in
issue," the client waives any privilege or work product protection it
would otherwise have for those communications. 143 If, in the
137.
138.
139.

140.

Id. at 549 n.20.
See id. at 531-36, 539 (citing Rambus v. Infineon, 222 F.R.D. at 287).
Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins., No. 01-4183,
2007 WL 1752036, at *7 (D.N.J. June 18, 2007) (finding prima facie support for in
camera review of privileged materials where counsel and client failed to comply with
discovery orders).
126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989).

141.

See id.at 546-47, 550.

142.
143.

See id. at 547-50.
See, e.g., Rambus v. Infineon, 220 F.R.D. at 288-89 (holding that disclosure of a
document retention policy and "some of the reasons for adopting [that] policy" in
defending against spoliation and crime-fraud allegations put at issue and waived all
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opening hypothetical, ABC were to defend against XYZ's motion
based on its counsel's analysis of the duty to preserve backup tapes,
that defense would place counsel's advice "inissue."
A client could knowingly chose to waive any privilege. ABC, for
example, might feel that its preservation actions were proper and
voluntarily disclose them to attempt to defeat XYZ's sanctions
motion. Similarly, a party may inadvertently waive privilege and
work product protection for counsel's involvement in the
preservation process, if and to the extent the party claims that its
preservation efforts were adequate as a defense to claims of
spoliation. 144 Further, given the traditionally restricted scope of
attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting, a number of courts
have held that the attorney-client privilege can be waived where
counsel's internal investigation had the effect of shielding critical
facts from
discovery and preventing effective examination of
1 45
witnesses.
At the same time, a client might assert that counsel's advice or
actions were negligent, as a defense to spoliation. 14 6 In these
circumstances, under the "self defense" doctrine, counsel might be
relieved of their ethical obligation to preserve client confidences and
permitted to disclose attorney-client communications in their own
defense.147 This issue was recently addressed in the ongoing

144.

145.
146.

147.

advice of counsel that went into the preparation of the document retention policy);
United States ex reL Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (D.
Md. 1995) (concluding that voluntary disclosure of privileged communications
waives the privilege as to all communications on the same subject matter).
See McKenna v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 2:05-cv-0976, 2007 WL 433291, at
*3-4 (D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2007) (noting that the defense of "adequate investigation" will
waive privilege claims for documents prepared by attorneys involved in conducting
an investigation).
See, e.g., Baker v. GMC, 197 F.R.D. 376, 391 (W.D. Mo. 1999); In re S. & E.Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 730 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL
66932, at *11 n.6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), enforcing 2007 WL 2900537 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 2007), vacated and remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008
WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). Qualcomm asserted that "outside counsel
selects . . . the custodians whose documents should be searched" in an effort to
deflect sanctions. Id. at *10 n.6. In the subsequent March 5, 2008, order vacating
and remanding the action in part, the district court expressly applied the "self
defense" doctrine, noting that the attorneys targeted by the former client's allegations
should be permitted to use privileged communications in their defense. Qualcomm,
2008 WL 638108, at *2-3.
See, e.g., Qualcomm, 2008 WL 638108, at *2-3; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(b)(5) (2007) (permitting an attorney to disclose confidential client information
"to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
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Qualcomm litigation, when Qualcomm blamed its counsel for failure
to discover and produce information relevant to a patent suit. 148 The
attorneys then sought permission to disclose privileged and
confidential information.1 49 Their request to disclose privileged
information was initially denied by the United States magistrate
judge:
[T]he Court holds that the federal self-defense exception
does not apply to the instant situation in which a client and
its attorneys are alleged to have engaged in discovery
misconduct during the course of litigation and the case has
not concluded. Unlike the cases cited in the pleadings and
during the hearing [citations omitted], the instant dispute
does not involve a new suit or potential suit by a third party
against the attorneys nor has the client initiated any
complaints or allegations against its attorneys. Because
Qualcomm has not waived the attorney-client privilege and
this Court holds that the self-defense exception is not
applicable, the attorneys' declarations should not include
privileged communications. The declarations, however,
may include information protected by the attorney work
product doctrine. Because federal common law mandates
that work product is a privilege that belongs to the attorney,
the Court finds that if the attorneys choose to waive the
attorney work product privilege in their declarations, doing
so does not violate the attorneys' ethical duties and
professional responsibilities under Rule 3-100 of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct, Section 6068 of
the California Business
50 and Professions Code, or other
applicable regulations. 1
On review of the magistrate judge's decision, however, the district
judge analyzed four declarations filed by Qualcomm employees. 5 1
Those filings "were exonerative of Qualcomm and critical of the

148.
149.

150.
151.

lawyer and the client.., or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
the lawyer's representation of the client").
Qualcomm, 2008 WL 66932, at *11 n.6.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of the Heller Attorneys' Motion
for an Order Determining that the Federal Common Law Self-Defense Exception to
Disclosing Privileged and/or Confidential Information Applies to the Heller
Attorneys' Response to the Order to Show Cause at 10-12, Qualcomm, No.
05cv1958-B (BLM) (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 2821221.
Qualcomm, 2007 WL 2900537, at *1.
Qualcomm, 2008 WL 638108, at *3.
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443

services and advice of retained counsel."' 152 The court found that the
declarations introduced sufficient "accusatory adversity" to cause it
to vacate the prior decision with respect to the six sanctioned
attorneys.1 5 3 It held that the attorneys should be permitted to defend
their conduct by disclosing
privileged information under the self54
defense exception.'
To summarize, there are a number of doctrines that would, in
certain circumstances, support a decision to consider attorney-client
implementation communications where there has been a failure to
preserve ESI.
V. QUO WARRANTO?: WHAT IS THE BASIS OF A COURT'S
POWER TO CONSIDER THE CONTENT OF SOME
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS WHEN THERE
WAS A BREACH OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE?
Where there has not been a breach of the duty to preserve, courts
have rejected requests to probe the content of attorney-client
preservation communications, holding them to be either privileged or
work product.155 When, however, there has been a breach of the duty
to preserve, courts have found it necessary and appropriate to inquire
into the content of attorney-client communications.'
The analytical
framework for addressing requests to discover the content of these
communications is not uniform.
A.

The Differing Views

In the view of some courts, such as the court in Gibson v. Ford
Motor Co., 15 7 attorney-client communications, such as the legal hold
notice, are privileged and/or subject to the work product
protection. 58 As such, they are not discoverable unless59an exception
to the privilege is applicable, as in Rambus v. Infineon.1
Other courts appear to implicitly view the communications as not
privileged.
The communications become both relevant and
discoverable upon the showing of a failure to preserve required
152.
153.
154.
155.

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
In India Brewing, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 192 (E.D. Wis. 2006),
where there was no showing of a loss of ESI, the court held that the document
retention policy was irrelevant to the claims or defenses.
See, e.g., Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422,435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
510 F. Supp. 2d 116 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
See id. at 1123-24.
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 283 (E.D. Va. 2004).
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information. This is apparently the view taken in Zubulake VI-16 0 and
Land 0 'Lakes.161
B. Implications of the Differing Views
The differing approaches present more than an academic
distinction, because the scope of the communications that may be
considered may not be the same under each of these theories. If
consideration of the attorney-client communications implementing
the duty to preserve is grounded on the assumption that the
communications are not privileged or work product, once found
relevant, there might be no limitation to the scope of discovery into
those implementing communications
and actions taken in carrying
62
out the duty to preserve.'
If attorney-client communications are considered under a waiver
analysis, the disclosing party must factor the governing jurisdiction's
substantive law of waiver into the mix. A party would not, for
example, be likely to voluntarily disclose privileged information to
defeat a spoliation motion if the collateral effect of that disclosure
was a broad privilege waiver, especially one that went beyond
implementation communications.
If the allegedly spoliating party asserts an "advice of counsel"
defense, by pointing to counsel's advice and actions in defense of the
alleged spoliation, the scope may be determined under a separate
rule. 163 In this circumstance, under the doctrine of "in issue" waiver,
all attorney-client communications
on the same subject matter may
164
become discoverable.
160.

229 F.R.D. at 435-36.

161.

244 F.R.D. 614, 623 (D. Colo. 2007).

162.

The text refers to implementing communications and actions, drawing a distinction
between those events and attorney-client communications that constitute pure legal
advice or counsel's opinion work product relating to the duty. That distinction may
be difficult to draw in practice.

163.

See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 486 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The

164.

attorney-client privilege may be waived by a client who asserts reliance on the advice
of counsel as an affirmative defense .... The party opposing the defense of reliance
on advice of counsel must be able to test what information had been conveyed by the
client to counsel and vice-versa regarding that advice ....
" (citations omitted)).
See id. at 486-87 (holding that, where client relies on advice of counsel, client cannot
"define selectively the subject matter of the advice of counsel on which it relied in
order to limit the scope of the waiver"); United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 917,
918-20 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (discussing factors considered in evaluating scope of
waiver); contra Qualcomrn Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008
WL 66932, at *13 n.8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) ("Recognizing that a client has a right
to maintain this privilege and that no adverse inference should be made based upon
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Alternatively, where a client attempts to place blame for a failure to
preserve on counsel during litigation, the result may be limited to a
partial disclosure. For example, in Qualcomm, the court initially held
that counsel could not invoke the "self defense" doctrine to disclose
privileged information; however, counsel were permitted to disclose
work product to defend themselves.' 65 In a later decision, however,
the court held that the self defense doctrine was applicable and the
scope of the waiver remains to be seen on remand. 166
Application of the crime, fraud, or tort exception would likely open
the door only to consideration of a more limited set of facts. That
exception may be invoked only upon a prima facie showing that the
client has engaged in the requisite misconduct in failing to preserve
relevant documents. 167 Because the crime, fraud, or tort exception is
interpreted narrowly and the court's proper inquiry would be limited
to those communications "in furtherance of' the alleged spoliation,
not all attorney-client communications made in connection
with
68
fulfilling the duty to preserve would be discoverable.'
Thus, to understand the scope of permissible discovery once the
door is opened, it is necessary to determine the justification for
demanding or ordering discovery of some attorney-client
communications. In appropriate circumstances, of course, more than
one rationale may be properly applicable.
C. Resolution of the Differing Views: A Duty-BasedApproach
In Fisher v. United States, the Supreme Court wrote that the
privilege "protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain
informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the
the assertion .... "), enforcing 2007 WL 2900537 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007), vacated
and remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal.

165.
166.
167.

168.

Mar. 5, 2008).
Qualcomm, 2007 WL 2900537, at *1.
Qualcomm, 2008 WL 638108, at *3.
See, e.g., Rabushka ex rel. United States v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 566 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that, to apply crime-fraud exception to a particular document, the
challenging party must make a threshold showing that the legal advice was made in
furtherance of the alleged fraud or closely related to it); In re Int'l Sys. & Controls
Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding plaintiffs must
establish that corporate management had "specific intent" to commit fraud through
development of the challenged work product documents for the crime-fraud
exception to apply); Loustalet v. Refco, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 243, 246 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
(holding crime-fraud exception does not apply where client sought advice of counsel
regarding the legality of his conduct prior to submitting false statement to SEC but
counsel was not used "to further" the illegal activity).
See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 288-91 (E.D. Va. 2004).
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privilege." 169 If the duty to preserve ESI was imposed solely on the
client, and counsel's job was limited to advising the client on the
nature and scope of that duty, attorney-client communications
relating to the duty to preserve would fall squarely within the
privilege protection under the Fisher rule. But decisions such as
Zubulake V have held that the duty is not the client's alone, and that
counsel has an independent duty to ensure that relevant information
is
71
preserved. 170 That duty runs to the court and the justice system.'
It appears that the Zubulake V court may have considered attorneyclient communications because those communications were relevant
in light of the preliminary showing of breach of the duty to preserve,
and because they were exchanged pursuant to a common-law duty
imposed on counsel, not in connection with the client voluntarily
seeking legal advice. 172 Thus, under this analysis, the duty to

169.
170.

425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
As the Zubulake V court wrote:
I held that UBS had a duty to preserve its employees' active
files as early as April 2001, and certainly by August 2001, when
Zubulake filed her EEOC charge....
[T]he central question
implicated by this motion is whether UBS and its counsel took all
necessary steps to guarantee that relevant data was both preserved
and produced.

171.
172.

... Counsel must oversee compliance with the litigation hold,
monitoring the party's efforts to retain and produce the relevant
documents.
229 F.R.D. 422, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (emphasis added). The court stressed the
need for "[p]roper communication between a party and her lawyer." Id. at 432.
Other authorities on this point are cited supra note 88.
See discussion infra note 178.
A corollary to the duty to preserve information by effective communications is the
court's power to allocate sanctions between attorney and client. A court, faced with a
failure to preserve or failure to produce relevant evidence, may need to determine
whether the duty was breached by counsel, on the one hand, or by the client, on the
other, or by both. See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 430, 432-34; see, e.g., Qualcomm
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CV1958-B(BLM), 2007 WL 1031373 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 21, 2007) (ordering party to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed
on Qualcomm's counsel for litigation misconduct in denying the existence of
relevant evidence). One leading commentator has noted that "the analysis of the duty
of preservation at the beginning of litigation and throughout the discovery process
focuses on the intent and behavior of the parties and counsel .... ." Kenneth J.
Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure,4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 62 (2006),
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/journals/njtip/v4/n2/3/.
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preserve, and the related duty to communicate in furtherance of that
duty to preserve, are considered obligations of counsel, and, under
Fisher,those compelled communications are outside the penumbra of
the privilege and work product protections. They become relevant
and discoverable upon a preliminary showing of failure to preserve
information that should have been preserved. eBay, Gibson, and
other decisions indicate that litigation hold notices are not
discoverable, at least without a preliminary showing of a failure to
preserve evidence.173 Although these courts have understandably
treated attorney-client communications in the process of carrying out
the duty to preserve as privileged or work product, an alternative
rationale is that those communications that make up the process of
identifying and preserving relevant information are not privileged at
all. They constitute neither the giving nor receiving of "legal
advice," and the privilege was not intended to cover routine
communications between counsel and client when engaged in
fulfilling this duty to the adversary system. Under Fisher, because
these communications are mandated, they would have occurred even
in the absence of a privilege and therefore they are not protected by
the privilege. 74 This theory fits the basic concepts of privilege.
Specifically, privilege is in derogation of full disclosure
and should
175
be limited to communications to obtain legal advice.
This analysis is also consistent with the multiple decisions
permitting discovery. Zubulake, Keir, Rambus, Cache La Poudre
Feeds, Capellupo, United Medical Supply Co., and other decisions
support the proposition that, where there is a preliminary showing of
failure to comply with the duty to preserve, some preservation
communications between76 attorney and client become relevant and,
therefore, discoverable.
173.

174.

See Gibson v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (N.D. Ga. 2007); In re eBay
Seller Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-01882 JF (RS), 2007 WL 2852364 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2,
2007); see also Muro v. Target Corp., No. 04 C 6267, 2007 WL 3254463, at *9 (N.D.
I11.Nov. 2, 2007) (finding that litigation hold notices appeared to be privileged on
their face, so not discoverable absent another reason).
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("[S]ince the privilege has the
effect of withholding relevant information from the fact-finder, it applies only where
necessary to achieve its purpose. Accordingly it protects only those disclosures
necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent
the privilege." (citation omitted)).

175.

Id.

176.

This duty-based approach does not make the communications automatically
discoverable. Just as the document retention policy was irrelevant in India Brewing,
Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 194 (E.D. Wis. 2006), in the absence of
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D. Advantages of a Duty-Based Approach
Treating these implementing communications as not privileged can
provide counsel and client with a number of very significant benefits.
First, it facilitates the resolution of discovery disputes by removing
the risk of subject-matter waiver from the disclosure of what counsel
has done and learned in the back and forth with the client on what
there is, where it is, what should be preserved, and how it should be
preserved. In the opening hypothetical, for example, ABC's counsel
retained a non-testifying forensic computer expert and, at counsel's
direction, the expert and ABC employees preserved some ESI and
paper documents, but-in conjunction with ABC's attorneysdetermined that other ESI, e.g., certain back up tapes and deleted
data, need not be preserved. Tactically, ABC may believe that a
reviewing court will agree with ABC's approach, and ABC might
wish to disclose these facts in response to XYZ's sanctions motion.
If the communications were privileged, ABC would risk waiver of
the privilege by disclosure. If, however, the communications were
unprivileged, but irrelevant in the absence of an allegation of breach
of duty, ABC could disclose them without concern that it would be
waiving the privilege.
Treating implementing communications as not privileged, but
irrelevant absent a preliminary showing, would not be inconsistent
with the purposes of the privilege and the work-product doctrine.
The duty to preserve goes to the heart of the adversary system and the
attorney's ethical responsibilities. 177 If relevant information may be

any showing of a loss of ESI, the attorney-client implementation communications are
not relevant to any claim, defense, or the subject-matter of the action.
177.

See Silvestri v. GMC, 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The courts must protect

the integrity of the judicial process because, '[a]s soon as the process falters ... the
people are then justified in abandoning support for the system."' (quoting United
States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993)); Cache La Poudre
Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 620 (D. Colo. 2007) ("To ensure

that the expansive discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1) does not become a futile
exercise, putative litigants have a duty to preserve documents that may be relevant to
pending or imminent litigation."); United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed.
Cl. 257, 258-59 (2007) ("Aside perhaps from perjury, no act serves to threaten the

integrity of the judicial process more than the spoliation of evidence. Our adversarial
process is designed to tolerate human failings--erring judges can be reversed,
uncooperative counsel can be shepherded, and recalcitrant witnesses compelled to
testify. But, when critical documents go missing, judges and litigants alike descend
into a world of ad hocery and half measures-and our civil justice system suffers.

To guard against this, each party in litigation is solemnly bound to preserve
potentially relevant evidence."); RICE, supra note 130, at 123 ("Spoliation is an act
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destroyed when litigation is anticipated, the basic premises of the
judicial system are brought into question. Just as the crime, fraud, or
tort exception is grounded on the need to protect the integrity of the
justice system, and on common-sense limits to the attorney-client
privilege, a duty-based analysis furthers the same goal. 178 Just as
there is no need to protect communications relating to a future crime
or fraud, there is no need for implementation discussions to be
protected by a privilege, if they become relevant due to a breach of
the duty.
Another practical advantage of this approach is that it is grounded
on conditional relevancy, not on more adversarial concepts, such as
the crime, fraud, or tort exception to the privilege. Because it is
triggered by a preliminary showing of loss of discoverable
information, rather than the showing of attorney-misconduct, this
approach, unlike the crime-fraud exception, would permit inquiry
into such communications upon the negligent loss of discoverable
information and could avoid acrimonious and protracted discovery
disputes.
E. Summary
If implementation communications are viewed as unprivileged, but
conditionally protected from discovery as wholly irrelevant, that
conclusion will have the practical benefit of facilitating the resolution
of discovery disputes. The "duty" rationale appears best suited to
effectuate the purposes of both the privilege and the duty to preserve.
Adequate protection may be provided to attorney-client preservation
communications in the absence of a loss of discoverable information,
because disclosure of those communications would be wholly
irrelevant to the claims, defenses, and subject-matter of the action.
Where counsel has performed properly, and the client has done
what it should do, so that the requesting party is unable to make a
preliminary showing of a breach of the duty to preserve ESI,

that is fundamentally inconsistent with the adversary system."); Maria Perez Crist,
Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electronic

178.

Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 63 (2006) ("[T]he need to maintain an institutional
memory lies at the core of our judicial system."); Withers, supra note 172, at 189
("[T]he duty to preserve potential evidence is essential to the courts' truth-seeking
function, and the routine operations of computer systems cannot be allowed to
obstruct justice.").
See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 284 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(noting that consulting an attorney to commit a crime or fraud is inconsistent with the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege).
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attorney-client communications would not be discoverable. Although
they may have been made in furtherance of a duty, and not in
connection with privileged legal advice, absent a preliminary
showing of breach of the duty to preserve, the communications are
wholly irrelevant to any claim or defense and to the subject-matter of
the action. The communications also would not be discoverable
under the crime, fraud, or tort, fact work product, or attorney "self
defense" exceptions, because there has been no wrongdoing. And,
the opposing litigant's interests are fully protected because that party
has the right to ask the client in discovery what steps the client took
to comply with the duty to preserve.
Where the requesting party is able to make a preliminary showing
of a failure to preserve, because the attorney-client communications
were exchanged in furtherance of an extrinsic legal duty-the duty to
preserve information-and because the preservation of potential
evidence is fundamental to fair and equitable civil litigation, courts
may permit discovery into the litigation hold, the steps taken or not
taken by counsel, and the client's response to those steps. This is
necessary both to further the civil justice system and to allocate
responsibility between attorney and client.
VI. THE OUTER LIMIT OF CONSIDERING ATTORNEYCLIENT COMMUNICATIONS: "PURE" LEGAL ADVICE
The outer limit, if any, of the power to consider attorney-client
communications in the context of a breach of the duty to preserve
remains to be determined. Decisions such as Keir, as well as Sedona
Guideline No. 9, demonstrate that, even where ESI has been lost,
some communications may be privileged. 179
The limit on
discoverability may vary depending upon the applicable rationale.
Thus, what is discoverable under a duty-based approach may differ
from that available under the other theories, and more than one
rationale may apply.
The importance of this analysis was recently demonstrated in
Qualcomm. 180 Faced with misconduct resulting in the failure to
produce ESI, and entertaining a request to sanction Qualcomm and its
attorneys, in both initial opinions the United States magistrate judge
179.
180.

See Keir v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8781(DLC), 2003 WL 21997747, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003).
See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), enforcing 2007 WL 2900537 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007),
vacated and remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008).
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in Qualcomm viewed some communications as privileged. 18 1 For
example, the magistrate judge wrote:
Qualcomm asserted the attorney-client privilege and
decreed that its retained attorneys could not reveal any
communications protected by the privilege.
Several
attorneys complained that the assertion of the privilege
prevented them from providing additional information
regarding their conduct. This concern was heightened when
Qualcomm submitted its self-serving declarations describing
the failings of its retained lawyers. Recognizing that a client
has a right to maintain this privilege and that no adverse
inference should be made based upon the assertion, the
Court accepted Qualcomm's assertion of the privilege and
has not drawn any adverse inferences from it.182
The magistrate judge held that only work product could be
disclosed by the defending attorneys;' 83 however, the district judge
subsequently ruled that the self defense doctrine permitted disclosure
of privileged material. 184 In neither decision was the court required
to specify the scope or limits of that disclosure.
A continuous thread of this article has been that there are attorneyclient communications that relate to implementation of the duty to
preserve, on the one hand, and communications involving "pure"
legal advice, on the other. In the opening hypothetical, for example,
ABC's president asks ABC's attorney to define the outer contours of
the duty to preserve, and the attorney and client discuss how those
principles are applicable to ABC in this instance. ABC's counsel
also determined that certain ESI, e.g., specific back up tapes and
deleted data, need not be preserved, based on counsel's analysis of
case law defining the duty to preserve back up tapes and data that are
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.
Under a duty-based approach only implementing communications
and actions are not privileged. ' Thus far courts have not seen the
need to probe actual legal advice. It appears that such an intrusion
should seldom, if ever, be necessary or compelled. If ABC's counsel
determined that back up tapes need not be preserved based on
counsel's analysis of case law, XYZ needs to know, at most, only
181.
182.
183.

Qualcomm, 2007 WL 2900537, at *1; Qualcomm, 2008 WL 66932, at *13 n.8
(citations omitted).
Qualcomm, 2008 WL 66932, at * 13 n.8.
Qualcomm, 2007 WL 2900537, at *1.

184.

Qualcomm, 2008 WL 638108, at *3.

185.

See supra Part V.C.
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that the decision was made. XYZ has no need to know the rationale
of ABC's attorney.
Under this approach, courts would not permit discovery of
counsel's legal advice, even advice directly related to the
preservation of information such as advice on the duty to preserve,
the scope of required preservation, and the legal risks of failing to
preserve. To go beyond the non-privileged actions and routine
communications involved in the actual process of implementing
preservation, a party alleging spoliation would be required to show
much more, such as a waiver, a prima facie showing that the
opposing party's failure to preserve falls within the crime, fraud, or
tort exception to the privilege, or some other basis for intruding upon
the privilege or work product doctrine.
Thus, the investigation into a party's compliance with its duty to
preserve should be a multi-step process that in most situations can go
no further than consideration of implementing communications. As
illustrated in eBay, the first step is discovery of facts from the client
demonstrating how the litigation hold was implemented. 116 If it then
becomes necessary or appropriate to proceed more deeply into the
nature of attorney-client communications to determine the magnitude
of, and prejudice caused by, the failure to preserve, courts may
cautiously expand that inquiry and consider some of the routine
attorney-client communications involved in satisfying the duty to
preserve. This might include when a litigation hold was issued,
whether and when a forensic expert was retained, what persons were
identified as "key players," whether outside ESI storage facilities
were contacted, whether "janitor" programs were suspended, what
key words were searched, what was preserved, what was not
preserved, and whether the lost information was unique, relevant, and
significant. 187 If, however, counsel advised a client that litigation
holds involve decisions as to whether litigation is reasonably
anticipated, choice of law, and proportionality considerations, there
186.
187.

In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-01882 JF (RS), 2007 WL 2852364, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007).
See memorandum from John Rosenthal & Tara Kowalski, to Judge Shira Sheindlin,
Howrey Simon, LLP, 12 (Nov. 14, 2007) (available on request) ("To ensure that the
discovery process is transparent, objective facts, such as what preservation steps were
taken and when, should not be considered privileged. On the other hand, advice from
counsel, in any form, regarding the identification, preservation, collection, and
production of discovery should be privileged .... [I]f a party informs his [or her]
attorney that he [or she] inadvertently (or advertently) destroyed documents, that
communication should be privileged, even though the fact that the documents were
destroyed is not privileged.").
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appears to be no cogent reason for requiring disclosure of that advice,
absent application of an exception to the privilege.
Nothing contained in this analysis would prohibit a litigant from
making a voluntary disclosure.' 88 Such disclosures would be
facilitated if the party had taken steps to engage in communications
implementing the process of preservation with the express
understanding that they were not confidential and did not incorporate
legal advice, so that they could easily be disclosed without the need
for "redaction" to refute any allegations of failure to preserve that
might later be raised. That disclosure of non-privileged information
would not extend the outer boundary of discovery to encompass pure
legal advice.
Applying these principles to the hypothetical involving ABC
Corporation, and XYZ Corporation, the threshold inquiry would
center on XYZ's showing that ABC had breached the duty to
preserve by failing to effectively communicate. XYZ might make
this showing either by routine discovery into the processes followed
by ABC employees to preserve information 189 or, alternatively, by
evidence such as that presented by Ms. Zubulake, who had retained
paper copies of email that UBS failed to produce. 190 Upon a
preliminary showing, at least portions of ABC's litigation hold letter
would likely be discoverable. Specifically, the untimely date of the
letter, preservation instructions given to ABC employees, as well as
the addressees, should be discoverable. A reviewing court would
likely wish to determine whether the letter inadequately directed
preservation of generic categories, such as "relevant evidence," or
specific documents, such as letters related to the June 2003 contract.
If the letter contained litigation strategy and work product, that
portion would likely be subject to redaction, unless needed to
evaluate the effectiveness of the letter. It is likely that the key players
could and would, upon request, be compelled to testify as to what
they were instructed to do in connection with preservation efforts,
what they were not instructed to do, and what they did. For example,
if they were instructed not to preserve back up tapes, that instruction
188.
189.

190.

Prudence would suggest consideration of the precautions outlined in Hopson v.
Mayor of Bait., 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005).
XYZ might, for example, ask a key employee whether his or her email had been
preserved, whether back up tapes had been recycled, or whether the employee's
home computer contained ESI that was relevant, but not preserved. Under eBay, this
information would be discoverable without any showing of a failure to preserve.
2007 WL 2852364, at *2.
Zubulake V,229 F.R.D. 422,428 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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would likely be discoverable. If counsel did not speak with a key
player, that fact would also be discoverable. If the corporate
employees failed to follow counsel's instructions, that failure would
have to be disclosed. The steps taken by ABC's non-testifying,
retained forensic expert, and by ABC's employees, to preserve
information, e.g., which hard drives were imaged and when, whether
servers were preserved, whether PDAs were examined, whether voice
mail was preserved, what the cost of preserving backup tapes is, etc.,
would be discoverable, even if that discovery would necessarily
disclose instructions of counsel. In some circumstances, counsel's
instructions might be ordered disclosed. Counsel's legal advice
would not be discoverable, unless, for example, it was placed in issue
by an "advice of counsel" defense to the spoliation motion or by an
express waiver by the client.' 91
VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In today's practice, counsel and their clients are well advised to
think early and often about the potential for discovery on discovery.
Especially in the highly complex world of e-discovery, even with
good faith efforts, it is very easy to fail to preserve or lose relevant
information by inadvertence. 92 Even the inadvertent loss of relevant
data may lead to probing questions into the conduct of counsel and
client before a court resolves a sanctions motion.
For this reason, counsel and client should be aware, when drafting
preservation documents and engaging in implementation discussions,
that those documents and discussions may voluntarily or
involuntarily be presented to a court for review in connection with a
spoliation motion. Prudence suggests, for example, that litigation
hold letters should not contain surplus tactical and strategic
discussions, and should be no more expansive than necessary to
effectively accomplish the preservation task. It may be advisable to
circumscribe preservation discussions and segregate notes regarding
the implementation of preservation efforts from substantive
communications involving the merits of the dispute. Additionally, all
participants in the adversary process need to consider the probability
that, even absent a preliminary showing of breach of the duty to
preserve, the steps taken by a client to preserve information are likely
discoverable, and that discovery may indirectly disclose some
information regarding attorney-client communications.
191.
192.

See Part IV.C-D.
See generally Grimm et al., supra note 16.
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The preserving party may desire to disclose information about its
preservation efforts, without disclosing strategic information, in order
to attempt to dissuade or defeat a spoliation motion.'9 3 The opponent
may seek such information to support a spoliation argument.
As a tactical or strategic matter, attorney and client may
intentionally draft some or all preservation documents in a manner
that would create the option of disclosing them without waiving any
privilege.
If implementation discussions are viewed as
communications that are unprivileged because they are compelled by
a legal duty, nothing would prohibit voluntary disclosure and such
disclosure could be made without concerns relating to waiver of
privileges. Careful drafting may make it easier to respond to a
spoliation motion.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Certain facts-such as what steps a litigant took, or failed to take,
to preserve material-should be deemed routinely discoverable.
Other facts, such as the contents of a litigation hold letter, and
attorney-client implementation discussions, should require a greater
showing to support disclosure. Actual legal advice, if disclosable at
all, should be discoverable only upon a more compelling showing
and, perhaps, after in camera review. Although, where there is
evidence of a breach of the duty to preserve, there are multiple bases
for seeking discovery of some attorney-client preservation
communications, the least problematic approach is to assert that
implementation communications are unprivileged, compelled
exchanges that are only conditionally relevant.
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See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:

BEST PRACTICES
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
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